Maryland Personal Jurisdiction Law in the Cyberspace Content by Gul, Saad
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 45
Number 1 Fall 2014 Article 2
2014




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Computer Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and
the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation





MARYLAND PERSONAL JURISDICTION LAW IN THE 
CYBERSPACE CONTEXT 
 




In the late 1930s, Winston Churchill disclaimed any ability 
to forecast the Soviet Union's reaction to Nazi aggression, 
reputedly terming the Russian colossus ‘a riddle wrapped in 
a mystery inside an enigma.’ That phrase might just as aptly 
describe the doctrinal vagaries of the concept of personal 
jurisdiction.2 
 
century ago, personal jurisdiction largely hinged on a simple litmus test: 
the defendant’s presence in the forum state.  The issue of personal 
jurisdiction gained prevalence as the nation evolved from its earlier days of 
detached, semi-sovereign entities, whose citizens rarely interacted, to a 
nation where interstate commerce had increased, with interstate litigation 
growing correspondingly.3  In Pennoyer v. Neff,4 the Supreme Court of the 
United States effectively limited5 a state’s jurisdiction to persons physically 
present within its territorial borders.  However, in today’s increasingly 
1 Associate, Saul Ewing LLP. The author would like to thank Donald A. Rea of Saul 
Ewing and Brian Boyd of Terrence Carmody for their insights into this piece.  I 
would also like to thank Emily Weil, Lauren Vint, and Katelyn Vu of the University 
of Baltimore Law Forum for their assistance.  The views expressed herein are the 
author’s alone, and do not represent the position of Saul Ewing LLP or any other 
entity. 
2 Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462 (1st Cir. 1990). 
3 See Lindy Burris Arwood, Note, Personal Jurisdiction: Are the Federal Rules 
Keeping Up with (Internet) Traffic?, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 967, 976-78 (2005) 
(providing historical context). 
4 95 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1877) (holding that “to subject the property of a non-resident 
to valid claims against him in the [s]tate, ‘due process of law would require 
appearance or personal service before the defendant could be personally bound by 
any judgment rendered”’ (internal citation omitted)). 
5 At the time, Pennoyer would have represented a virtually universal understanding.  
See, e.g., Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and 
Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313, 332 n.100 (2013) (“Jurisdiction of 
the person or property of an alien is founded on its presence or situs within the 
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interconnected world, physical presence appears to represent an anachronism 
set in the post-Civil War, horse-and-buggy America of Pennoyer.   
     Since then, long-arm jurisdiction has devolved into a confused “state of 
flux, if not chaos . . . a ‘mess of state long-arm legislation and vacillating 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.’”6  Personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has 
become a latter-day rule against perpetuities, befuddling litigators7 and 
courts8 alike.  This befuddlement is compounded by the rapid evolution of 
technology.  Technological progress generates jurisdictional wrinkles at a 
pace that consistently outstrips the ability of the legal profession to deal with 
them.  
     In recent years, the complexity of those issues has increased exponentially 
by the development of cyberspace;9 actors a world away can exert influence 
in Maryland with the touch of a keystroke.  Of course, at the headquarters of 
the National Security Agency (“NSA”), actors in Maryland can return those 
intrusions with interest.  However, for counsel representing clients other than 
the NSA, the issue of what level of “cyber” or “virtual” activity suffices to 
allow Maryland to assert jurisdiction over an actor is one with immediate 
repercussions.10  
     The overarching theme of this article is that Maryland courts do, and 
should, adapt to these changes the same way they have adapted to previous 
technological developments:, such as the rise of the automobile or the 
corporate form, by adapting existing concepts to new developments, rather 
6 Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for A Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law 
Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309, 1312 (1999). 
7 See, e.g., Viron Int’l Corp. v. David Boland, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d 812, 818 (W.D. 
Mich. 2002) (“[P]laintiff is confused about the concept of personal jurisdiction.”). 
8 See, e.g., Leema Enters. v. Willi, 582 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“The 
jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction, however, is an occasionally confusing and 
complex area of the law.”); Babich v. Karsnak, 528 A.2d 649, 653 (Pa. Super. 1987) 
(“Federal district courts sitting in Pennsylvania have professed that the issue of 
personal jurisdiction over such individuals is a somewhat confusing area of law 
which has divided courts in this circuit for at least a decade.”); Curtis v. Curtis, 789 
P.2d 717, 725 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (“The Utah and Mississippi trial courts 
apparently confused the rules concerning subject matter jurisdiction with those of 
personal jurisdiction.”). 
9 “Cyberspace” can be defined as the “total interconnectedness of human beings 
through computers and telecommunication without regard to physical geography.”  
STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30745, CYBERWARFARE 1 (June 
19, 2001), http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL30735.pdf. 
10 See Russell J. Weintraub, A Map out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 531 (1995) (“[T]he threshold determination of personal 
jurisdiction has become one of the most litigated issues in state and federal courts . . 
. .”). 
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than creating new jurisprudence to this end.11  As the Fourth Circuit has 
explained: 
 
Until the due process concepts of personal jurisdiction are 
reconceived and rearticulated by the Supreme Court in light 
of advances in technology, we must develop, under existing 
principles, the more limited circumstances when it can be 
deemed that an out-of-state citizen, through electronic 
contacts, has conceptually ‘entered’ the State via the Internet 
for jurisdictional purposes.12 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND TERRITORIALITY 
 
Pennoyer was premised on two simple principles.  First, a state had 
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its 
territory.13  Second, it was powerless over persons and property not within its 
territory.14  Therefore, the Court effectively barred states from exercising 
personal jurisdiction over person or property outside those territorial limits.15  
Seventy-five years after Pennoyer,  in International Shoe v. Washington, the 
Supreme Court replaced territoriality as the touchstone of jurisdiction with a 
new test: Whether the defendant had sufficient “minimum contacts” with the 
forum so that the assertion of jurisdiction would not offend “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice[?]”16  In tying jurisdiction to the 
nature of defendants’ activity in a particular state, the Court acknowledged 
that the rise of the corporate form, an entity that did not readily lend itself to 
the old litmus test of physical presence, required the development of a new 
test for personal jurisdiction.17  
11 Cf. Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(“Just as our traditional notions of personal jurisdiction have proven adaptable to 
other changes in the national economy, so too are they adaptable to the 
transformations wrought by the Internet.”); S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine 
Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 543 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“The construction of the 
information superhighway does not warrant a departure from the well-worn path of 
traditional personal jurisdiction analysis trod by the Supreme Court and innumerable 
other federal courts, which leads to the exercise of personal jurisdiction only when a 
foreign corporation has had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.  I 
conclude today that a web site alone does not minimum contacts make.”). 
12 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 
2002). 
13 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 723. 
16 Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
17 Id. (“Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be 
acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual its ‘presence’ 
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     International Shoe did not mark an abrupt departure from Pennoyer.  
First, Pennoyer itself had allowed for certain exceptions.18  Second, in the 
intervening years, the Court had accepted a series of fictions that effectively 
circumvented Pennoyer’s apparently iron-clad territoriality rule, such as 
fictions of implicit consent via tortious conduct,19 or implicit presence20 via 
the conduct of business activities.  In an interesting precursor to internet 
interactivity disputes, the Court drew distinctions between jurisdictions 
where a corporation “merely” solicited business, and those in which it 
undertook additional activities.21   
     However, as the dissent in International Shoe presciently warned, the new 
test was hopelessly nebulous, relying on “vague Constitutional criteria,” and 
introduced tremendous uncertainty by substituting “elastic standards” for 
simplistic standards.22  The very concerns that Justice Black’s dissent 
identified in International Shoe continue to plague personal jurisdiction 
today.  However, with fantastic scenarios involving space-based or ship-
borne servers rapidly evolving from the realm of science fiction into reality, 
– Google has sought a patent for clusters of servers floating on artificial 
islands on the high seas23 territoriality would have been no panacea for 
jurisdiction issues in cyberspace.24  
     Even in current circumstances, where system configurations can filter out 
contacts within particular jurisdictions,25 territoriality is no silver bullet.  
Cyberspace does not necessarily equate to its physical manifestation.  The 
Fourth Circuit has already held that the location of servers in Maryland does 
not rise to the level of minimum contacts: “It is unreasonable to expect that, 
merely by utilizing servers owned by a Maryland-based company, 
[defendant] should have foreseen that it could be haled into a Maryland court 
without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities 
carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
18 See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733-35 (divorce actions could be adjudicated in 
plaintiff’s home state even absent service within the state); id. at 735-36 (foreign 
corporation doing business in a state was deemed as having consented to suit in the 
state). 
19 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354-56 (1927). 
20 Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917). 
21 Int'l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583, 589 (1914). 
22 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 323-25 (Black, J., dissenting). 
23 Water-Based Data Center, U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued 
Apr. 28, 2009); Ashlee Vance, Google’s Search Goes Out to Sea, N.Y. TIMES BITS 
BLOG (Sept. 7, 2008, 9:59 PM), http:// bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/googles-
search-goes-out-to-sea/ (Google has sought a patent for clusters of servers floating 
on artificial islands on the high seas). 
24 See generally Andrews & Newman, supra note 4, at 325. 
25 Michael Traynor & Laura Pirri, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Emerging 
Trends and Future Directions, 712 PRACTICING L. INST. 93, 121-22 (2002). 
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and held to account for the contents of its website.”26  Additionally, in a 
North Carolina case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the level of contacts 
created between a defendant and a North Carolina web server as de 
minimis.27 
     Indeed territoriality had already receded as the sine qua non of 
jurisdiction by the 1950s.  The Court would subsequently explain the 
rationale for the shift in McGee v. International Life Insurance: 
 
In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation 
of our national economy over the years.  Today many 
commercial transactions touch two or more [s]tates and may 
involve parties separated by the full continent.  With this 
increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great 
increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across 
state lines.  At the same time modern transportation and 
communication have made it much less burdensome for a 
party sued to defend himself in a [s]tate where he engages in 
economic activity.28 
 
     McGee was decided in the same term as Hanson v. Denckla, which added 
an additional requirement to substantial justice and fair play: To be subject to 
specific jurisdiction, there must be “some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum [s]tate.”29  “Purposeful availment” means that the defendant’s 
“contacts proximately result from the actions by defendant himself that create 
a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum [s]tate.”30  
     In World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, the Court reinforced Denckla’s 
holding, reiterating that the traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice would not suffice unless the defendant’s conduct and connection with 
the forum state were such that he could reasonably “anticipate being haled 
into court there.”31  This was illustrated in Calder v. Jones, with the Court 
finding jurisdiction where the defendant purportedly committed intentional 
acts expressly aimed at California, knowing “the brunt of that injury would 
be felt” there.32   
     The Court further reinforced the Calder analysis in Burger King v. 
Rudzewicz, when it was called upon to determine if a contractual undertaking 
26 Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th 
Cir. 2003). 
27 Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 
209, 217 n.9 (4th Cir. 2001). 
28 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957). 
29 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
30 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (emphasis in original). 
31 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294-95, 297 (1980). 
32 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). 
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sufficed to confer personal jurisdiction consistent with Due Process 
standards.33  It held that the defendant must have a “substantial connection”34 
with the forum state: “[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by 
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit and protection of 
its laws.”35 
     Burger King appears to be the last jurisdiction case to achieve a majority.  
The first post-Burger King case, Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Ct. of 
Cal.,36 split the Court.  Justice Scalia aside, the Justices agreed that on the 
facts of the case exercising personal jurisdiction would “offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice[.]”37  However, no five members 
could agree on the underlying rationale.  Under Court precedent,38 the 
narrowest common ground between the concurring Justices is the holding of 
the case.  In Asahi, the Int’l Shoe “fair play and substantial justice” test was 
the narrowest common ground. . 
     The Supreme Court recently revisited the issue in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. 
v. Nicastro,39 and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.40  
However, the Court did not articulate any new rules.  Although Justices 
Breyer and Alito have suggested that the Supreme Court needs to clarify 
jurisdiction in light of rapid globalization and developments in commerce 
and communications “not anticipated by our precedents,”41 the Court has yet 
to do so.  
     Indeed, the Court may not be able to articulate a separate test beyond Int’l 
Shoe42 for cyber-jurisdiction.43  In cyber-jurisdiction, as in other 
33 471 U.S. at 478. 
34 Id. at 475 (citing McGee, 355 U.S. at 222). 
35 Id. (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). 
36 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
37 Id. at 113 (involving an indemnification claim by one foreign defendant against 
another) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 
38 In Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), the Court explained how the 
holding of a case should be viewed where there is no majority supporting the 
rationale of any opinion:  “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”  
39 See 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).  See also Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal 
of the Supreme Court's Decision in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 341, 345 (2012) (stating that the three McIntyre opinions “exacerbated 
rather than ameliorated the doctrinal confusion.”). 
40 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
41 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 131 S. Ct. at 2791. 
42 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54 (reaffirming that the Int’l Shoe test remains 
applicable to determine specific jurisdiction) (internal citations omitted). 
43 See Quill Corp. v. N.D., 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court 
“ha[s] abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant's ‘presence’ 
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jurisdictional disputes, the pivotal issue remains the defendant’s actions and 
his connection with a forum state.44  There is a strong argument that 
territoriality is retained as an implicit element of jurisdiction,45 and that even 
minimum contacts are simply a surrogate for physical presence.46  Case law 
concerning cyberspace-related jurisdiction will evolve incrementally in 
response to technological developments in the same way it has responded to 
other technological changes.47  Maryland courts will continue to draw on the 
bricks-and-mortar minimum contacts analysis when determining whether 
they have jurisdiction over defendants for cyber activities in the foreseeable 
future.  
 
III. APPLICATION: CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AND GENERAL VERSUS 
SPECIFIC JURISDICTION 
 
     Personal jurisdiction has constitutional implications.48  Therefore, to 
comply with Due Process, the defendant must have “minimum contacts” 
with Maryland, such that any exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”49   “[I]t is essential 
in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully 
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities” within Maryland.50  The 
“nature” of the defendant’s contacts with Maryland must be a factor in the 
within a [s]tate in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant's 
contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of 
Government, to require it to defend the suit in that [s]tate”). 
44 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion) 
(“This Court’s precedents make clear that it is the defendant’s actions, not his 
expectations, that empower a state’s courts to subject him to judgment.”). 
45 Burnham v. Super. Ct. of C.A., Cnty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 606, 618 (1990) (Scalia, 
J.) (plurality opinion) (holding that, following Int’l Shoe, “defendant’s litigation-
related ‘minimum contacts”’ with the forum could “take the place of physical 
presence as the basis for jurisdiction”). See also Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose 
Co., 35 F.3d 939, 941 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he establishment of a surrogate for 
presence has been the core task in defining the due process boundaries of a state’s 
legitimate exercise of sovereignty over a person beyond its borders.”). 
46 ESAB Grp. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Stover v. 
O’Connell Assoc., 84 F.3d 132, 136 (1996)) (stating that minimum contacts 
jurisprudence has developed as a “surrogate for [physical] presence in the state 
because a state’s sovereignty remains territorial and its judicial power extends over 
only those persons, property, and activities in its borders”). 
47 See Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
48 See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850 (“A state court's assertion of jurisdiction exposes 
defendants to the State's coercive power, and is therefore subject to review for 
compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.”).  
49 Unspam Tech., Inc. v. Chernuk, 716 F.3d 322, 328 (4th Cir. 2013). 
50 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
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analysis.51  The Court also considers “the relationship among the defendant, 
the forum, and the litigation,”52  with the plaintiff’s interest not being a factor 
in the constitutional inquiry.53  Therefore, personal jurisdiction will exist if 
the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in 
Maryland.54  
     Jurisdiction is not monolithic.  There are two varieties of jurisdiction, 
“specific” and “general.”55  “If the defendant’s contacts with [Maryland] 
form the basis for the suit,” then Maryland courts have specific jurisdiction.56  
“If the defendant’s contacts... are not the basis for the suit,” then the 
defendant must have “continuous and systematic” contacts with the state 
sufficient to enable a Maryland court to exercise general jurisdiction.57  As 
might be expected, the test for general jurisdiction is significantly more 
stringent than that for specific jurisdiction.58  Courts have found contacts 
sufficient to justify specific, but not general, jurisdiction within the same 
case.59 
     In the cyberspace context, it is difficult to envision a scenario in which a 
defendant would be subject to general jurisdiction in Maryland on the sole 
basis of its cyber activities.60  Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable.  There is 
at least one Pennsylvania decision which found that a Maryland defendant 
was subject to general jurisdiction by virtue of its interactive website.61  
51 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-17 (1984). 
52 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). 
53 Wendy C. Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal 
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 508-09 (1987) 
(“[M]odern courts continue to perceive personal jurisdiction as a confrontation 
between state power and the defendant, with the plaintiff's interest being largely 
irrelevant.”). 
54 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
55 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
56 Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 388 Md. 1, 26, 878 A.2d 567, 
582 (Md. 2005).  
57 Id. at 24, 878 A.2d at 580. 
58 ALS Scan v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 715 (“[T]he threshold 
level of minimum contacts sufficient to confer general jurisdiction is significantly 
higher than for specific jurisdiction.”) (internal citations omitted). 
59 Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 874, 876 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that Ohio courts 
lacked general jurisdiction over a nonresident business that registered domain names 
despite the fact that the defendant had, over its website, registered domain names for 
over 4,000 Ohio residents, but did have specific jurisdiction). 
60 See Robbins v. Yutopian Enter., 202 F. Supp. 2d 426, 429 (D. Md. 2002) (holding 
that general jurisdiction did not exist where defendant conducted forty-six 
transactions in ten and a half months with Maryland residents, some of which were 
completed through its active website). 
61 See Mar-Eco, Inc. v. T & R & Sons Towing & Records, Inc., 837 A.2d 512, 517-
18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding that the defendants’ website provided a basis for 
general jurisdiction because customers could use the website to “apply for 
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General jurisdiction requires sufficient systemic and continuous contacts, 
such that the defendant is effectively domiciled in the state, and has 
substantial, ongoing, and concrete contacts in addition to its cyber 
activities.62  
     Specific jurisdiction premised on cyberspace activity presents a much 
knottier issue, and one that does not readily lend itself to bright-line tests.  
Many jurisdictions other than Maryland have grappled with the issue without 
developing a bright-line test.63   
      
IV. THE ZIPPO TEST 
 
     The seminal case64 in the area of internet personal jurisdiction is a 1997 
decision from the U.S. District Court  for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.65  Before Zippo, some 
courts had taken a quasi-Pennoyer approach of strict territoriality: 
accessibility of a defendant’s website or other web activity equaled 
jurisdiction.66  Other courts pointed out that this analysis meant that any 
defendant with a cyber presence was subject to jurisdiction throughout the 
employment, search the new and used vehicle inventory, apply for financing to 
purchase a vehicle, calculate payments schedule, order parts and schedule service 
appointments”).  See also Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079-
80 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant is subject to general jurisdiction on the 
basis of its internet activities), vacated as moot, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005). 
62 Estate of Bank v. Swiss Valley Farms, Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 514, 517-18 (D. Md. 
2003) (“[G]eneral jurisdiction is ordinarily reserved for those defendants who have 
such substantial contacts with the forum state that they may be considered 
‘essentially domiciled’ within that state.”). 
63 Kline v. Williams, No. 05-01101 (HHK), 2006 WL 758459, at *2 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(“[T]he challenged conduct at hand . . . presents the difficult yet extremely important 
task of adapting traditional standards of personal jurisdiction to [i]nternet activity”); 
Maritz Inc. v. Cybergold Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (“The 
[I]nternet . . . raises difficult questions regarding the scope of court’s personal 
jurisdiction in the context of due process jurisprudence”); Savage Universal Corp. v. 
Grazier Const., Inc., No. 04 CIV. 1089 (GEL), 2004 WL 1824102, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“The question of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants has become 
increasingly complex in the internet age.”). 
64 Richard K. Greenstein, Essay, The Action Bias in American Law: Internet 
Jurisdiction and the Triumph of Zippo Dot Com, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 21, 30 (2007) 
(describing the “utter dominance” of the Zippo test and the “difficult[y]” in finding a 
jurisdiction which uses a different analysis for internet jurisdiction). 
65 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
66 Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996); 
Minnesota ex rel Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 
WL 767431, at *11 (Minn. Dist. Dec. 11, 1996). 
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nation.67  Still, other courts adopted a hybrid approach, finding that the level 
of activity within the forum state, including the number of hits, must reach a 
critical mass to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction.68  Personal 
jurisdiction could be predicated on as few as six hits.69  A fourth and final 
approach focused on the practical business effects of the defendant’s internet 
activity.70  
     Against this backdrop, the Zippo court’s decision on a motion to dismiss a 
trademark infringement complaint for lack of jurisdiction became the 
touchstone of cyberspace jurisdiction analysis.71  In Zippo, the court posited 
a continuum of interactivity against which websites were to be 
benchmarked.72  At one end of the continuum lay defendants who were 
doing business in the forum; that they did so over the Internet was tangential 
to the legal issue.73  These defendants were clearly subject to jurisdiction.  At 
the other end were “passive” websites where defendants had merely posted 
information that was accessible to interested readers.74  These defendants 
were just as clearly not subject to jurisdiction.  
     In between, there were lay defendants who fell in neither category 
because they had “interactive Web sites where a user can exchange 
information with the host computer.”75  Alternatively, as the Fourth Circuit 
has put it, “[o]ccupying a middle ground are semi-interactive websites, 
through which there have not occurred a high volume of transactions 
between the defendant and residents of the foreign jurisdiction, yet which do 
enable users to exchange information with the host computer.”76  To resolve 
these cases, Zippo adopted a “sliding scale” test, where jurisdiction turned on 
the degree and nature of the exchange: “[T]he exercise of jurisdiction is 
determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of 
the exchange of information that occurs on the [website].”77 
     Zippo is not without its critics.  First, technology in the intervening 
fourteen years has dramatically transformed our understanding of 
67 Naxos Res. Ltd. v. Southam, Inc., 1996 WL 635387, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 
1996); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997). 
68 Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481, 486 (W.D.N.C. 1997). 
69 Am. Network, Inc. v. Access Am./Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494, 499 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
70 Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 465, n.18 (D. 
Mass. 1997). 
71 As of the date of writing, Zippo has been cited 5,306 times.  
72 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 
1997). 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 399 (4th Cir. 
2003). 
77 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
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interactivity.78  At the time of writing, most, if not all, websites have some 
“interactive” features.  Therefore, jurisdiction defaults to the thorny middle, 
where the test has the least predictive value.  One commentator notes that the 
vast middle area of  Zippo “has created a black hole of doubt and confusion, 
as courts have struggled with the question of whether an interactive site 
constitutes purposeful availment.”79 
     Even the textbook defendant who “clearly does business over the 
Internet” no longer presents an obvious case.  Some Maryland courts have 
found sales to Maryland residents to be sufficient for jurisdiction.80  Others 
have reached the opposite conclusion.81  These divergent outcomes are not 
easily reconciled.  However, scrutiny of the underlying analysis reveals that 
courts are increasingly disinclined to adhere to the original Zippo paradigm 
of gauging the sufficiency of contacts by the level of interactivity on the 
defendants’ website.  As one decision explained, “[d]epending on the facts 
presented, website interactivity may have some bearing on the jurisdictional 
analysis, but it does not control the outcome.”82  Consequently, courts focus 
their analysis on the relationship between website interactivity and the forum 
state as the pivotal issue.83  
     This does not mean that Zippo is dead. It does mean, however, that 
jurisdiction does not turn on a mechanical assessment of the interactivity of 
the website.84  Indeed, in the general jurisdiction context, a number of courts 
outside of Maryland have explicitly distinguished interactivity from contacts, 
holding that it is possible to have one without the other.85  Zippo does not 
78 Henning v. Suarez Corp. Indus., 713 F. Supp. 2d 459, 469 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
79 Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can't Always Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a 
Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147, 1166-
67 (2005). 
80 Young Again Prods., Inc. v. Acord, 307 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (D. Md. 2004) 
(“Despite the allegedly 'exceedingly low number of Internet sales by [Defendant] to 
consumers in Maryland' . . . [d]efendants do not and cannot dispute that they engage 
in business in Maryland.  Defendant’s [i]nternet activity is directly related to the 
claims brought against it in this action.”). 
81 Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 812 (D. Md. 2004); 
cf. United Cutlery Corp. v. NFZ, Inc., CIV. CCB-03-1723, 2003 WL 22851946, at 
*5 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2003) (holding that a single internet sale is sufficient to show that 
a company engaged in significant internet business activities in the forum state).\ 
82 Shamsuddin, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 811. 
83 Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003); cf. GTE 
New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(finding that there is no personal jurisdiction absent evidence that the forum 
residents used the defendant's interactive website). 
84 Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (D. 
Wis. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never held that courts should apply different 
standards for personal jurisdiction depending on the type of contact involved.”). 
85 See, e.g., CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1075-76 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Under 
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ignore the nature of defendants’ cyber operations and their relationship with 
the forum; instead, it establishes a framework for benchmarking them.86  It is 
a measure of purposeful availment.87  At one end of the Zippo continuum, 
where a foreign defendant puts up a purely informational website, it has not 
purposefully availed itself of the forum state and there is no jurisdiction.  At 
the other end of the continuum, where a foreign defendant uses the Internet 
to fire live ammunition into the forum state, clearly subjecting it to forum 
jurisdiction.88  Measured against these scenarios, the Zippo sliding-scale test 
serves as a useful proxy for a defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum, 
and whether it suffices to establish personal jurisdiction. 
     The crux of the issue is that interactivity or other site features cannot be 
evaluated independently, out of context to establish jurisdiction.  Judge 
Easterbrook has pointed out the inherent pitfall of developing specific tests 
for specific contexts; such hyper-focus is necessarily “doomed to be shallow 
and to miss unifying principles.”89  Thus, technical measures such as 
interactivity are appropriately evaluated as proxies for the nature of a 
defendant’s contacts with the jurisdiction, and whether they satisfy due 
process concerns.  Due process, not particular technical arrangements, is the 
touchstone of internet-based jurisdiction jurisprudence.90 
the Zippo test, it is possible for a [w]eb site to be very interactive, but to have no 
quantity of contacts.”); Hy Cite Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 1160 (D. Wis. 2004) 
(“[R]egardless how interactive a website is, it cannot form the basis for personal 
jurisdiction unless a nexus exists between the website and the cause of action or 
unless the contacts through the website are so substantial that they may be 
considered ‘systematic and continuous’ for the purpose of general jurisdiction.”). 
86 Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 703 n.7 (7th Cir. 2010) (referring to the 
sliding scale as “an alternative minimum-contacts test for Internet-based claims”). 
87 Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(expressing approval of Zippo's “`sliding scale' of interactivity to identify Internet 
activity that constitutes purposeful availment”).  See Innovative Garage Door Co. v. 
High Ranking Domains, LLC, 981 N.E.2d 488, 497 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“[W]hile a 
highly interactive website might indicate the quality of commercial contacts with the 
forum, it is the contacts themselves that would allow us to exercise jurisdiction 
rather than the mere fact that the website is interactive.”).  
88 Zachary M. Seward, Internet Hunting Has Got to Stop—If It Ever Starts, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at A1; cf. Buckley v. N.Y. Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 179 (2d 
Cir. 1967) (noting that “the publisher [of a libel] directly inflicts damage on the 
intangible reputation just as the frequently hypothesized but rarely encountered 
gunman firing across a state line does on the body”).  See, e.g., Neogen Corp., 282 
F.3d at 890; Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 703. 
89 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 207, 207-08. 
90 See, e.g., Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750 (D. 
Mich. 2000) (“[T]he need for a special [i]nternet-focused test for `minimum contacts' 
has yet to be established.  It seems to this court that the ultimate question can still as 
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     Indeed, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has analogously acknowledged 
that while a strict binary classification of contacts is not always possible, this 
is irrelevant as long as the underlying analysis corresponds to the necessary 
jurisprudential inquiry: 
 
The concept of specific and general jurisdiction is a useful 
tool in the sometimes difficult task of detecting how much 
contact is enough, and most cases will fit nicely into one 
category or the other. If, however, the facts of a given case 
do not naturally place it at either end of the spectrum, there 
is no need to jettison the concept, or to force-fit the case. In 
that instance, the proper approach is to identify the 
approximate position of the case on the continuum that 
exists between the two extremes, and apply the 
corresponding standard, recognizing that the quantum of 
required contacts increases as the nexus between the 
contacts and the cause of action decreases.91 
 
Interactivity is one means of benchmarking the level of contacts,92 but it is 
not the only one. 
 
V. DUE PROCESS AND LONG-ARM JURISDICTION IN MARYLAND 
 
     Notwithstanding criticisms, Zippo has been widely adopted.93  No other 
test has achieved similar general acceptance.  The Fourth Circuit has adopted 
readily be answered by determining whether the defendant did, or did not, have 
sufficient `minimum contacts' in the forum state.”). 
91 Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 312 Md. 330, 339, 539 A.2d 1107, 1111 (1988). 
92 See, e.g., Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 
227 n.7 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted) (“Although interactivity along the 
Zippo sliding scale can be an important factor in an internet-based personal 
jurisdiction analysis because it can provide evidence of purposeful conduct, internet-
based jurisdictional claims must continue to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, 
focusing on the nature and quality of online and offline contacts to demonstrate the 
requisite purposeful conduct that establishes personal jurisdiction.”) (citations 
omitted)); Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted) (“While analyzing a defendant’s conduct 
under the Zippo sliding scale of interactivity may help frame the jurisdictional 
inquiry in some cases . . . it does not amount to a separate framework for analyzing 
internet-based jurisdiction. Instead, traditional statutory and constitutional principles 
remain the touchstone of the inquiry.”). 
93 Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 251-52; Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 
F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 
883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002); Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 
1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 
1999); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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its own three-part version of the Zippo test.94  The Fourth Circuit has 
instructed trial courts deciding a jurisdictional challenge to consider: (1) the 
extent to which the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities in Maryland; (2) whether the plaintiff’s claims arise 
out of those activities directed at Maryland; and, (3) whether the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.95  It has 
separately held that simply placing information on the Internet does not 
create personal jurisdiction.96  
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland has, in turn, adopted the Fourth 
Circuit’s three-part test.97  The analysis begins with the Maryland long-arm 
statute.98  Maryland jurisprudence holds that even though the limits of the 
long-arm statute are coextensive with constitutional limits, the statutory 
inquiry may not be dispensed with, and analysis must begin with the 
statute.99  The rationale is that there may be factual situations where the long-
arm statute is not applicable even though constitutional requirements are 
met.100  Put another way, if the defendant has contacts falling within the 
enumerated instances, then the statute is applicable to the constitutional 
limit.101  Thus, jurisdictional analysis is a two-part process: (1) whether the 
contacts are covered in the long-arm statute; and, (2) whether this is within 
the constitutional limit.102 
 
VI. THE MARYLAND LONG-ARM STATUTE 
 
     The starting point for any specific jurisdiction analysis is Maryland’s 
long- arm statute.  The statute provides that Maryland courts may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who (1) transacts any business or 
performs any character of work or service in Maryland; (2) contracts to 
supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in Maryland; (3) 
causes tortious injury in Maryland by an act or omission in the state; (4) 
94 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 
2002). 
 
95 Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 397 (4th 
Cir. 2003). 
96 ALS Scan, Inc., 293 F.3d at 714. 
97 MaryCLE v. First Choice Internet Inc., 166 Md. App. 481, 499, 890 A.2d 818, 828 
(2006). 
98 See generally MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103 (West 2014). 
99 Mackey v. Compass Mktg., Inc., 391 Md. 117, 141, 892 A.2d 479, 493 n.6 (2006) 
(citing Beyond v. Realtime, 388 Md. 1, 877 A.2d 567 (2005)). 
100 Krashes v. White, 275 Md. 549, 559, 341 A.2d 798, 804 (1975). 
101 Ellicott Mach. Corp., Inc. v. John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 477 (4th Cir. 
1993). 
102 Bond v. Messerman, 391 Md. 706, 721, 895 A.2d 990, 999 (2006) (citing 
Mackey, 391 Md. at 29-30, 892 A.2d at 486). 
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causes tortious injury inside or outside Maryland by an act or omission 
outside the state if he or she regularly does or solicits business, engages in 
any other persistent course of conduct in the state, or derives substantial 
revenue from goods, food, services, or manufactured products used or 
consumed in the state; (5) has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property 
in Maryland; or (6) contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any person, 
property, risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be 
performed within Maryland at the time the contract is made, unless the 
parties otherwise provide in writing.103  Interestingly, the statute specifically 
provides that it is applicable to “computer information and computer 
programs in the same manner” as goods and services.104 
 
A. Analysis in the Cyber Context 
 
     Three provisions of the long-arm statute are the most frequently litigated 
in the cyber context.  Section (b)(1) subjects any defendant who “transacts 
any business” in Maryland to jurisdiction within the state;105 defendant need 
not be engaged in business for profit.106  The question of what constitutes 
“transacting business” is complex. It is clear that a tangential connection 
with Maryland will not suffice under the “purposeful availment” test.107  
Therefore, “Maryland courts have construed the phrase ‘transacting business’ 
narrowly, requiring, for example, significant negotiations or intentional 
advertising and selling in the forum state.”108  
     The defendant need not have been physically present in Maryland.109  
Nevertheless, the plaintiff must show “some purposeful act in Maryland in 
relation to one or more of the elements of [the] cause of action” pursuant to 
Section (b)(1).110 It is not always clear what level of cyber activity, and what 
103 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103(b)(1)-(6) (West 2014). 
104 Id. § 6-103(c)(2). 
105  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6–103(b)(1) (West 2014). 
106 Novack v. Nat'l Hot Rod Ass'n, 247 Md. 350, 356, 231 A.2d 22, 26 (1967). 
107 Capital Source Fin., LLC v. Delco Oil, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 304, 316 (D. Md. 
2007).  
108 Music Makers Holdings, LLC v. Sarro, No. RWT–09–1836, 2010 WL 2807805, 
at *3 (D. Md. July 15, 2010). 
109 Capital Source Fin., LLC, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (“Subsection (b)(1) does not 
require the defendant to have been present physically in Maryland.”); Bahn v. 
Chicago Motor Club Ins. Co., 86 Md. App. 559, 634 A.2d 63, 67 (1993) (“The 
defendant need never have been physically present in the state.”). 
110 Talegen Corp. v. Signet Leasing & Fin. Corp., 104 Md. App. 663, 669, 657 A.2d 
406, 409 n.3 (1995).  See also Dring v. Sullivan, 423 F. Supp. 2d 540, 546 (D. Md. 
2006) (“[I]t appears arguable that Defendant performed work or service in Maryland 
in connection with his referee duties, the cause of action does not arise from that 
work or service.”); Bond v. Messerman, 162 Md. App. 93, 116, 873 A.2d 417, 430 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (“The fact that Messerman referred his client to Sheppard 
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level of corresponding effects, satisfy the requirement.  What is clear is that 
mere communication, whether by electronic111 or other means, will not 
suffice because they do not equate to transacting business within the meaning 
of Section (b)(1).112  
     Section (b)(3) appears to have generated relatively little case law 
involving internet contracts. Perhaps this is because of the requirement that 
both the tortious conduct and the injury must occur in Maryland.113  Such 
conduct implies that a defendant has developed connections within the state 
that could support personal jurisdiction.  However, it is easy to envision 
cyber activity,114 such as anonymous defamation, where the location is not 
always known to the plaintiff, even if it is identifiable.115  Envision a hacker 
in a remote locale whose spyware program replicates itself and eventually 
ends up in Maryland.  Did the tortious act in fact occur in Maryland?  Can 
the plaintiff establish that it occurred in the state?  Personal jurisdiction is 
often not available in such instances.116  The plaintiff might seek 
jurisdictional discovery as a compromise measure if he can otherwise make 
out a prima facie case for jurisdiction.   
     Section (b)(3)’s location restrictions may be why plaintiffs appear to 
prefer section (b)(4), where the tortious conduct need not occur in 
Maryland.117  Section (b)(4) requires that the defendant’s contacts with 
Maryland be extensive, continuous and systematic before it can be subject to 
specific jurisdiction in a Maryland court.118  However, the “persistent 
conduct” requirement requires that the plaintiff must establish that the 
Pratt has no bearing as to the jurisdictional issue because that referral is in no way 
connected to Bond’s cause of action against Messerman.”). 
111 See, e.g., Chattery Int’l., Inc. v. JoLida, Inc., No. WDQ–10–2236, 2011 WL 
1230822, at *14 (D. Md. 2011) (rejecting the assertion that emails to Maryland 
constitute purposeful availment). 
112 See Music Makers Holdings, LLC v. Sarro, No. RWT–09–1836, 2010 WL 
2807805, at *6 (D. Md. July 15, 2010) (“A defendant does not ‘transact business' 
within the meaning of section 6-103(b)(1) of Maryland's long-arm statute by sending 
written communications to a purported infringer of its rights.” The Music Makers 
court relied on a number of decisions that “have uniformly held that cease-and-desist 
letters alone do not establish personal jurisdiction.”).  See also Bond, 162 Md. App. 
at 93, 873 A.2d at 417. 
113 Dring, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (D. Md. 2006). 
114 There are many cyber activities the legal system has just begun to grapple with.  
See People v. Marquan, No. 139, slip op. 04881 (N.Y. App. Ct. July 1, 2014). 
115 See, e.g., Chattery Int’l, 2011 WL 1230822 at *14 (“Assuming that [plaintiff] has 
been injured in Maryland, it has not shown that the [alleged tortious conduct] took 
place in Maryland.”). 
116 Id. 
117 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103(b)(3)-(4) (West 2014). 
118 Virtuality L.L.C. v. Bata Ltd., 138 F. Supp. 2d 677, 683–84 (D. Md. 2001) 
(rejecting argument that website presence constituted “persistent course of conduct 
in the [s]tate” under § 6-103(b)(4)). 
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defendant had “greater contacts than those necessary to establish jurisdiction 
under (b)(1).”119  Thus, a plaintiff who cannot establish jurisdiction under 





     In one illustrative case, the forum selection clause in the company’s 
“Terms of Use” brought defendants within the ambit of the statute by virtue 
of their internet activity.121  In CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Field, the plaintiff, 
CoStar, provided subscription-based information to proprietary data on its 
servers in Bethesda.122  The Texas and Florida-based defendants allegedly 
accessed the servers utilizing the credentials of another customer.123  When 
CoStar sued, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  
The court denied the Motion, partially on the basis of the Maryland long-arm 
statute.124 
     The court noted that defendants allegedly had a business relationship with 
CoStar for years, by accessing data and contacting technical support 
personnel.125  The court viewed this alleged conduct as falling within Section 
6–103(b)(1)’s ambit extending jurisdiction when a defendant “transacts any 
business or performs any character of work or service in the State.”126  It also 
indicated that jurisdiction might rest on claimed copyright infringement, 
which it viewed as falling within the Section 6-103(b)(4) provision extending 
jurisdiction to a foreign defendant who “[c]auses tortious injury in the State 
or outside the State if he . . . engages in any other persistent course of 
conduct in the State.”127  Against facts virtually identical to Field, the court 
in CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Meissner128 also predicated jurisdiction on the 
“transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the 
State” test of Section 6-103(b)(1). 
 
VII. WHAT CONSTITUTES PURPOSEFULE AVAILMENT IN MARYLAND 
119 Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks v. Bos. Paternity, LLC., No. DKC–2008–2046, 2009 
WL 2366175 at *8 (D. Md. July 28, 2009).   
120 Chattery Int’l., 2011 WL 1230822 at *15. 
121 CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Field, 612 F. Supp. 2d 660, 668–69 (D. Md. 2009). 
122 Id. at 665. 
123 Id. at 665–66. 
124 Id. at 672.  
125 Field, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 666. 
126 Id. at 671-72 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103(b)(1) (West 
2008)). 
127 Field, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 
6–103(b)(4) (West 2008)). 
128 CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Meissner, 604 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (D. Md. 2009) 
(quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6–103(b)(1) (West 2008)).  
                                                                                                                             




     Purposeful availment, and not cyber presence, is the sine qua non of 
specific jurisdiction in Maryland. Since purposeful availment requires that 
the defendant create a connection with Maryland,129 it is clear that Zippo will 
not be an issue where no Maryland residents are affected.130  
     The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland applied these 
principles in Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Products, specifically noting 
that the mechanics of the Internet did not alter traditional analysis.  “The 
construction of the information superhighway does not warrant a departure 
from the well[-]worn path of traditional jurisdiction analysis.”131 The issue 
was simply whether the defendant was “conducting electronic commerce” by 
virtue of its website.132  Shamsuddin began at the “floor” of the sliding scale 
annunciated in Zippo —a website that only offered information—and went 
on to note jurisprudential confusion over the definition of the “ceiling,” 
specifically the level of interactivity that would constitute “doing business 
over the internet.”133  
     The court went on to observe that “[w]ebsite interactivity is important 
only insofar as it reflects commercial activity, and then only insofar as that 
commercial activity demonstrates purposeful availment of the benefits or 
privileges of residents of the forum state or purposeful availment of the 
benefits or privileges of the forum state.”134  Ultimately, while it stopped 
short of clarifying what would suffice in the internet context, the court made 
clear that limited sales alone would not.135 
     Other cases have made it clear that purposeful availment, not the sale per 
se, is the touchstone of the personal jurisdiction analysis.  However, these are 
not mutually exclusive.  Even a single sale to a Maryland entity can 
suffice,136 but multiple sales may not.137  These divergent outcomes are 
129 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1985). 
130 See Am. Info. Corp. v. Am. Infometrics, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 696, 699 n.6 (D. 
Md. 2001) (stating a website’s interactive features were irrelevant where no 
Maryland residents were customers of the defendant). 
131 Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 811 (D. Md. 2004) 
(quoting S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 534 
(E. D. Pa. 1999)).  
132 Id. at 809.  
133 Id. at 809–10. 
134 Id. at 813. 
135 Id. at 810. 
136 See Jason Pharm., Inc. v. Jianas Bros. Packaging Co., 94 Md. App. 425, 432, 617 
A.2d 1125, 1128 (1993) (holding that a one-transaction contract with a Maryland 
entity, coupled with “sufficient evidence” of ‘purposeful activity,’” may constitute 
“transacting business” within the meaning of MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 
6-103(b)(1) (West 2011)).  
137 Eagle Coffee Co., Inc. v. Eagle Coffee Int'l, Inc., No. L-09-2585, 2010 WL 
481201, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2010). 
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impossible to reconcile if analyzed purely through the prism of technology.  
Alternatively, if their technological background is understood as a 
component of a larger legal analysis, with the touchstone being purposeful 
availment, then these divergent outcomes make sense.    
 
A. The Court of Appeals of Maryland Framework: Electronic Features 
as Contacts 
 
     In Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that the state could not exercise jurisdiction over 
non-Maryland defendants based on the fact that emails directed to Maryland 
residents contained hyperlinks to the defendants’ website.  The narrow heart 
of the holding was that mere access to the defendants’ website did not 
constitute purposeful availment of the state.138  The broader jurisprudential 
principle was that a plaintiff must show a nexus between the defendants’ 
cyber presence and the injury in Maryland.139 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s ruling that 
the plaintiff, whose employees had received the emails in question, had 
established neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants.140  It noted that general personal jurisdiction is predicated on a 
defendant’s “continuous and systematic” contacts with Maryland.141 It 
rejected the argument that accessibility of the defendants’ website in 
Maryland constituted the requisite continuous and systematic contacts within 
the state.142  
     Next, the court affirmed the trial court’s determination that Maryland 
lacked specific jurisdiction over the defendants.143 Specific jurisdiction 
turned on whether the defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the 
state.144  Absent a prima facie showing of an agency or other contractual 
relationship between the defendants and the sender of the emails, there was 
no purposeful availment.145  The court did not view the mere fact that the 
emails contained a link to an IP address registered to one of the defendants as 
sufficient to establish either an agency relationship or specific jurisdiction.  
     Beyond Systems, Inc. highlights both the advantages and the pitfalls of 
applying the post-International Shoe purposeful availment framework to 
138 Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 388 Md. 1, 28, 878 A.2d 
567, 583 (2005). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 25, 878 A.2d at 582. 
141 Id. at 22, 878 A.2d at 580 (quoting ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 
Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
142 Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 388 Md. at 25, 878 A.2d at 582. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at  25, 878 A.2d at 582 (citing Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy 
Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 397 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
145 Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 388 Md. at 25, 878 A.2d at 582.  
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internet issues.  It is easy to envision a scenario in which an unrelated third 
party directs emails, with links to a defendant’s website, to Maryland 
residents. Indeed, an enterprising Maryland resident could potentially collude 
with the unrelated third party to establish the basis of a lawsuit.  
Fundamental fairness and due process require that defendants not be subject 
to suit based on IP links to their website alone.  
     On the other hand, the nature of  cyberspace means that it may be 
exceedingly difficult for a party, except the most sophisticated entities, to 
identify relationships between different cyberspace actors. Absent discovery, 
a Maryland plaintiff will find it virtually impossible to unearth connections 
between real parties of interest and intermediary straw-men, a point neatly 
articulated by the dissent in Beyond Systems, Inc.: 
 
The elusive nature of Internet presence, together with the 
strong incentives for “spammers” to conceal their identities, 
portends that often there will be a dearth of jurisdictional 
facts in future cases brought under the Commercial 
Electronic Mail statute. The [Maryland] General Assembly 
has created a private cause of action to aid Maryland 
residents in the escalating battle against unsolicited, 
deceptive commercial email. The effectiveness of that tool 
will be diminished if we close the courthouse door to 
plaintiffs without providing them the means to uncover facts 
that would support personal jurisdiction.146 
 
The issue necessarily entails tradeoffs, and Maryland has yet to 
identify the optimal midpoint. 
 
B. Email Communication as Contacts 
 
     For purposes of determining jurisdiction, email communication is 
evaluated in the same manner as any other form of communication.147  As a 
result, email is functionally indistinguishable from a letter sent through the 
postal service.148  There is little dispute that the ease, automation, and sheer 
volume of  email makes it a different creature.  Maryland courts are still 
struggling with whether this difference is a matter of degree or an order of 
magnitude.149  It is doubtful whether jurisdiction premised on a single email 
146 Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 388 Md. at 34, 878 A.2d at 587 (Raker, J., 
dissenting). 
147 See id. at 20, 878 A.2d at 578–79. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. at 25, 878 A.2d at 582. 
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can pass a Due Process challenge.150 Alternatively, other states have found 
that transmission of unsolicited email can give rise to jurisdiction.151  
     Beyond Systems Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc. involved a situation where all four 
defendants, collectively, challenged personal jurisdiction, contending that 
they had no officers or employees in Maryland, owned no property there, and 
did not solicit or advertise business there.152  One of the defendants operated 
a website selling digital products.153  Another defendant was allegedly 
affiliated with marketers who drove Internet traffic to the website by various 
means, which purportedly included bulk email.154  A third defendant was a 
website that supposedly routed its own affiliates to the first defendant.155  
The fourth was an internet service provider who hosted technical services for 
the other defendants.156  
     The court found because the defendants were alleged either to have 
directed electronic communications into Maryland or to have co-operated 
with other defendants who did, the plaintiff was entitled to jurisdictional 
discovery, at least with regard to some defendants:  
 
[T]he core issue is whether [the defendants] in some material 
way “directed” the allegedly offensive email messages into 
this [state], either on its own or by agent; otherwise, given 
the obvious unsolicited nature of the requests that 
Marylanders make purchases through the Internet, it is clear 
that the senders manifested an intent to do business here and, 
to the extent that their messages are found to be false or 
misleading, that they created in a person within the [state] a 
potential cause of action under Maryland law.157 
 
     The holding highlighted the connection between the nature of the 
underlying claim, the alleged emails, and the jurisdictional issue.158  Absent 
the nexus between the underlying claim and the electronic communication, 
email alone will not suffice to support personal jurisdiction.159  
150 Hanks v. Kinetics Grp, Inc., 878 So. 2d 782, 786 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (asserting 
that jurisdiction in such circumstances “would offend the traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice”). 
151 Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774 (S.D. Miss. 2001); 
Verizon Online Servs. Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 622–23 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
152Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 527–28 (D. Md. 2006).  
153 Id. at 528. 
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 548.  
156 Id. at 528.  
157 Id. at 543–44. 
158 See id. at 548.  
159  Id. at 545 (citing Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 388 Md. at 27, 878 A.2d at 
583).  
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     For instance, in Consulting Engineers Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., the Fourth 
Circuit held that emails and telephonic communications, on their own, do not 
establish minimum contacts with the forum state.160  The defendant, a 
Colorado corporation, had limited contacts with the plaintiff, including four 
telephone calls and twenty-four emails.161  The plaintiff argued that the 
defendant had intentionally directed electronic communications into Virginia 
with the clear intent of transacting business there.162  The Fourth Circuit 
disagreed.163 It viewed the determinative test as the quality and nature of the 
defendant’s contacts.164  On the facts, even if the defendant had “reached 
out” via email, that fact, even in conjunction with additional emails and 
phone calls, did not suffice to establish personal jurisdiction.165 
     On the other hand, as in Keynetics, when the cause of action arises out of 
the emails, jurisdiction will lie, as illustrated in Marycle, LLC v. First Choice 
Internet, Inc.166  Marycle involved a New York company that purportedly 
emailed Maryland residents.167  The defendant conceded that it knew some 
emails would be opened in Maryland.168  The Maryland plaintiff purportedly 
emailed the defendant, asking that they not receive any more emails.169  The 
court observed that the defendant had to know that some of its emails, 
including those directed to the maryland-state-resident.com domain, would 
target Maryland, and could therefore anticipate being haled into court 
there.170  Since the defendant was aware that some emails would go to 
Maryland residents for the purpose of soliciting business, personal 
jurisdiction was proper.171  The issue was not the email exchange per se, but 
its role in underlying events: 
 
[W]hen considering the “nature” of [defendant’s] contacts, 
our focus should be on the fact that the emails are 
communications specifically and deliberately designed to 
convince the recipients to engage the services of [defendant] 
and to promote the products of its customers. Although 
[defendant] did not deliberately select Maryland or any other 
160 561 F.3d 273, 282 (4th Cir. 2009). 
161 Id. at 275–76. 
162 Consulting Engineers Corp., 561 F.3d at 279.  
163 Id. 
164 Id.  
165 Id. at 280.  
166 166 Md. App. 481, 509, 890 A.2d 818, 835 (2006) (citing Fenn v. MLeads 
Enters., Inc., 103 P.3d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)). 
167 166 Md. App. at 489–91, 890 A.2d at  822-24. 
168 Id. at 500, 890 A.2d at 829. 
169 Id. at 491-92, 890 A.2d at 823–24. 
170 Id. at 506-07, 890 A.2d at 833 (citing Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 312 Md. 
330, 340–41, 539 A.2d 1107, 1112 (1988)). 
171 Marycle, 166 Md. App. at 506, 890 A.2d at 833. 
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state in particular as its target, it knew that the solicitation 
would go to Maryland residents. Its broad solicitation of 
business “instantiates the purpose that makes the connection 
more than an ‘attenuated nexus,’ ” and thus it should be 
subject to jurisdiction “wherever its email[s] were 
received.”172 
      
C. Website Access as Minimum Contacts 
 
     Access to a defendant’s website in Maryland is generally insufficient to 
support personal jurisdiction.173 As the Fourth Circuit has explained, “the 
Internet is omnipresent—when a person places information on the Internet, 
he can communicate with persons in virtually every jurisdiction . . . .  [I]t 
would be difficult to accept a structural arrangement in which each [state] 
has unlimited judicial power over every citizen in each other [state] who uses 
the Internet.”174  The issue is whether access constitutes the type of 
purposeful availment that can lead the defendant to expect to be haled into 
court there.175  The answer is almost invariably no. 
     In Allcarrier Worldwide Servs., Inc. v. United Network Equip. Dealer 
Ass'n,176 the defendant was a Nebraska non-profit corporation. Via its 
website, it facilitated transactions in which its members, including a number 
of Maryland residents, bought and sold computer equipment.177  However, it 
did not undertake purchases or sales itself.178  The court held that absent a 
more proactive outreach to Maryland by the defendant, the mere existence of 
the website and its Maryland members did not subject the defendant to 
jurisdiction: 
 
Plaintiff, along with [thirteen] other Maryland residents, paid 
membership dues to [defendant] in order to gain full access 
to [defendant]'s website. However, the [c]ourt declines to 
find that the mere payment by a Maryland resident of 
membership dues to a non-resident, non-profit organization 
172 Id. at 509, 890 A.2d at 834-35 (citing Fenn, 103 P.3d at 162) (emphasis in 
original). 
173 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (2000). 
174 Id. at 712–13. 
175 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 466–67 (D. 
Mass. 1997) (distinguishing websites from telephone and fax calls because a mailed 
letter, telephone call, and a message sent by fax constitute a “singularly” directed to 
a state based on a letter's address or “telephone or fax number with a [particular] area 
code”). 
176 Allcarrier Worldwide Servs., Inc. v. United Network Equip. Dealer Assoc., 812 
F. Supp. 2d 676, 679, 684 (D. Md. 2011). 
177 Id. at 682. 
178 Allcarrier Worldwide Servs., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d at 682. 
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would subject that organization to personal jurisdiction in 
Maryland. Moreover, [p]laintiff does not contend that 
[defendant] transacts business and provides services in the 
[S]tate of Maryland any more than it does in every other 
state or country in which its 267 members reside, but surely 
[p]laintiff would not contend that [defendant] is subject to 
personal jurisdiction in every state in which it has a member. 
To find that the [c]ourt has personal jurisdiction here, based 
on mere membership dues to an organization, would 
eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirements of the long-
arm statute and the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause. 179 
      
     Similarly, in American Association of Blood Banks v. Boston Paternity, 
the court dismissed a trademark infringement claim for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.180  The defendant’s website contained a “live chat” feature 
permitting users to discuss pricing with a representative, which the Blood 
Banks court held was semi-interactive under Zippo.181  However, the 
defendant never entered into a transaction with any Maryland resident.182  
Nor did it direct its website into Maryland “with the manifest intent of 
engaging in any transaction with the state.”183  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the website, in addition to the application and payments that 
defendant had mailed into Maryland on an annual basis, did not satisfy 
Sections 6–103(b)(1) or (4) of the Maryland long-arm statute.184  It is notable 
that nothing in the court’s analysis indicates that a fully interactive website 
would have altered the outcome in the absence of additional connections to 
Maryland.185 
 
D. Sales as Contacts—In Context 
 
     Sales to Maryland residents present perhaps the most difficult 
jurisdictional question. On one hand, the sale of a product over the Internet to 
a Maryland resident, almost by definition, constitutes purposeful availment 
of its laws.186  However, where a defendant sells globally, or merely 
facilitates such sales, such as eBay, courts in other jurisdictions have found it 
difficult to determine whether the isolated or occasional sale can support 
jurisdiction comporting with the traditional notions of due process and fair 
179 Id. at 682-83. 
180 Am. Ass’n of Blood Banks v. Bos. Paternity, LLC, No. DKC 2008–2046, 2009 
WL 2366175, at *9 (D. Md. July 28, 2009). 
181 Id. at *8–9. 
182 Id. at *9. 
183 Id. 
184 American Ass’n of Blood, 2009 WL 2366175 at *9–10. 
185 Id. at *8–10. 
186 See Young Again Prods., Inc. v. Acord, 307 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (D. Md. 2004).  
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play.187  Of course, determining what level or frequency of sales would 
support due process is another knotty issue. 
     Where sales involve internet intermediaries, such as eBay, courts 
generally hold that defendants have not purposefully availed themselves of 
the forum, even if they have utilized interactive sites.188  Courts have held 
that selling goods over internet auction sites does not subject a defendant to 
the jurisdiction of the purchasers, despite the interactivity of internet auction 
sites.189  In United Cutlery Corp. v. NFZ, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maryland explained the rationale for such holdings: “Although the 
websites were interactive and designed for the purpose of selling products to 
participating users, [the defendant] exercised no authority over maintenance 
of the websites, nor did he exert control over the audience they targeted.”190  
     Noting that the defendant’s objective was to sell to the highest bidder, 
irrespective of a bidder’s state of residence, the court determined that the 
defendant had not “‘directed activity’ into Maryland with the ‘[manifest] 
intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the State.’”191  In 
other words, the defendant had not purposefully availed itself of the privilege 
of conducting business in Maryland.192  Interestingly, the defendant’s 
internet purchases from Maryland suppliers did not alter the outcome.193 
     Other scenarios are arguably closer calls.  For instance, in Eagle Coffee 
Co., Inc. v. Eagle Coffee International, Inc., the court dismissed a trademark 
infringement case for lack of personal jurisdiction.194  In Eagle Coffee, the 
only contacts the defendant had with Maryland were  a website that 
advertised its products, and  sales occurring over the past two years to seven 
Maryland customers.195  Taken together, the sales represented less than a 
0.1% of the defendant’s sales.196  The court found that nothing on the website 
indicated the defendant’s intent to target residents of Maryland.197  The court 
also concluded that the defendant’s interactions with the Maryland residents, 
such as asking them to “please come again,” confirming orders via phone, 
187 Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539, 542 (D. N.J. 2002); Winfield 
Collection, LTD. v. McCauley, 105                  F. Supp. 2d 746, 749, 751 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000).  
188 Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 810 (D. Md. 
2004); Machulsky, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 539; Winfield Collection, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 2d 
at 749. 
189 Shamsuddin, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 810.  
190 No. CCB–03–1723, 2003 WL 22851946, at *4 (D. Md. Dec.1, 2003). 
191 Id. at *8 (quoting ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714). 
192 United Cutlery Corp., 2003 WL 22851946, at *7. 
193 Id. at *6. 
194 Eagle Coffee Co., Inc. v. Eagle Coffee Int'l, Inc., Civ. L-09-2585, 2010 WL 
481201, at *1-2 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2010). 
195 See id. at *5–6. 
196 See id. at *6 n.4.  
197 See id. at *7. 
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and using nationwide delivery, were isolated instances that could not support 
jurisdiction.198 
     On the other hand, in Young Again Prods., Inc. v. Acord, the court 
asserted personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who was accused 
of using a Maryland corporation’s licensed marks after the distributorship 
agreement between the parties ended.199  While Maryland was not the focal 
point for defendants’ commercial activities—0.02% of their sales were to 
Maryland customers—the court found the “[d]efendants do not[,] and cannot 
dispute that they engage in business in Maryland.”200  The fact that an 
“exceedingly low number of [i]nternet sales” were to Maryland customers 
did not alter the calculus.201  Since the plaintiff’s claims were connected to 
the defendants’ alleged internet activities, the court found that jurisdiction 
would be appropriate under section 6-103(b)(1), and comport with the 
principles of fair play and substantial justice.202 
     As stated above, it is difficult to reconcile these varied results by looking 
to the role of Maryland sales alone.  Instead, Maryland sales are part of a 
complex matrix where the relative importance of Maryland to the defendant, 
the parties’ relationship, and the claims at issue all factor into the 
jurisdictional analysis.  
 
E. Forum Selection Clauses as Jurisdictional Consent 
 
     A defendant’s expressed or implied consent to a court’s jurisdiction 
satisfies due process requirements to assume jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant.203  Therefore, a “valid forum selection clause, standing alone, 
may confer jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”204  “[F]orum selection 
clauses permit parties to an agreement, in essence, to contract around 
principles of personal jurisdiction by consenting to resolve their disputes in 
198 Id. at *8.  
199 Young Again Prods., Inc. v. Acord, 307 F. Supp. 2d 713, 714-15 (D. Md. 2004). 
200 Id. at 717. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Field, 612 F. Supp. 2d 660, 668 (D. Md. 2009) 
(quoting Toshin Prods. Co. v. Woods, No. 86–2157, 1989 WL 87015, at *2 (D. Md. 
July 28, 1989)). 
204 CoStar Realty, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 668; Microfibres, Inc. v. McDevitt–Askew, 20 
F. Supp. 2d 316, 322 (D.R.I. 1998) (holding that an agreement to litigate contractual 
disputes in Rhode Island implicitly waived the right to challenge personal 
jurisdiction there); Inso Corp. v. Dekotec, 999 F. Supp. 165, 167 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(holding that a “contractual stipulation to a particular forum implies consent to 
personal jurisdiction in that forum”). 
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specified tribunals.”205  The Supreme Court has long held that forum 
selection clauses are enforceable.206  It recently reinforced that principle by 
emphasizing that forum selection clauses “should control except in unusual 
cases.”207  Consequently, forum selection clauses are generally respected. 208 
     There is no analytical reason why forum selection clauses in internet 
contracts should be exceptions to this general rule.  Many sites require the 
user to assent to a “Terms of Use” agreement before accessing them; when 
such “Terms of Use” agreements include forum selection clauses, even 
incorporated by reference to a hyperlink, courts have little difficulty in 
enforcing them.209 Given users’ reluctance to review “Terms of Use” 
agreements—up to the point of literally selling their immortal souls to the 
site owner—210this is an invaluable mechanism in resolving personal 
jurisdiction issues. Plaintiffs have argued that they have no recollection of 
agreeing to, or even reading, forum selection clauses to no avail.211  
205 Structural Pres. Sys., LLC v. Andrews, 931 F. Supp. 2d 667, 671 (D. Md. 2013) 
(quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cherry, No. ELH-11-2898, 2012 WL 1425158, at *15 
n.10 (D. Md. April 23, 2012)) (internal quotations omitted). 
206 Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1972); Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596–97 (1991). 
207 Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 
574 (2013). 
208 Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 345 Md. 361, 377, 692 A.2d 454, 463 (Md. 
1997) (Despite the presumption of validity, a forum selection clause may be found to 
be unreasonable and unenforceable if “(i) it was induced by fraud or overreaching, 
(ii) the contractually selected forum is so unfair and inconvenient as, for all practical 
purposes, to deprive the plaintiff of a remedy or its day in court, or (iii) enforcement 
would contravene a strong public policy of the State where the action is filed.”).  See 
Vulcan Chem. Techs., Inc. v. Barker, 297 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2002); 
TEKsystems, Inc. v. Demasi, No. GLR-14-670, 2014 WL 2882944, at *3 (D. Md. 
June 24, 2014) (absent a finding of unreasonableness, a mandatory forum selection 
clause should be enforced).  
209 See Moretti v. Hertz Corp., No. 13-2972, 2014 WL 1410432, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 11, 2014). 
210 See Catherine Smith, 7,500 Online Shoppers Accidentally Sold Their Soul To 
Gamestation, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/17/gamestation-grabs-souls-
o_n_541549.html (Noting only 12% of users challenged a clause that provided: “By 
placing an order via this Web site on the first day of the fourth month of the year 
2010 Anno Domini, you agree to grant Us a non transferable option to claim, for 
now and for ever more, your immortal soul.  Should We wish to exercise this option, 
you agree to surrender your immortal soul, and any claim you may have on it, within 
5 (five) working days of receiving written notification from gamesation.co.uk or one 
of its duly authorized minions.”). 
211 Fusha v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. RDB-10-2571, 2011 WL 3849657, at *2 (D. 
Md. Aug. 30,  2011) (“[W]hether she read the forum selection clause or not, it is 
undisputed that Fusha clicked the ‘I agree’ button on the vayama.com web site prior 
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     Maryland courts have found that forum selection and jurisdiction clauses 
in “Terms of Use” agreements are enforceable as to jurisdiction and venue, 
so long as the user agreed to those clauses.212  A single indication of assent 
will suffice. For example, use of the web site in LTVN Holdings LLC v. 
Odeh, required affirmation of a click-wrap agreement containing a Maryland 
forum selection clause.213  This met the consent criterion: “A party need not 
assent to an agreement multiple times in order for a contract to be 
enforceable . . . .  In this case, a single click was sufficient to bind [the 
defendant] and his company to the [a]greement.”214  Other Maryland cases 
have adhered to a similar analysis by finding jurisdiction exists by virtue of a 
forum selection clause.215 
     While a valid forum selection clause renders a lengthy analysis of 
minimum contacts unnecessary,216 there are exceptions which underscore the 
necessity of careful drafting.  In Micro Focus (US), Inc. v. Bell Canada, the 
Canadian defendant challenged a forum selection clause in an end-user 
license agreement (“EULA”) as “ambiguous and nonsensical.”217  The court 
agreed, holding that the clause was ambiguous.218 Since the issue implicated 
constitutional concerns, waiver could not be lightly inferred.219  Moreover, 
absent the clause, defendant’s sole connection to Maryland was the EULA 
itself, and would not meet the “minimum contacts” requirement.220 
 
VIII. PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT IN CYBERSECURITY: WHAT 
ACTIVITY IS DIRECTED AT MARYLAND? 
 
     Whether entry to the state was real or virtual should not matter; 
traditional notions of fair play and justice apply to both traditional 
and novel avenues of attack.221  In determining whether the exercise 
of specific personal jurisdiction comports with constitutional due 
to purchasing her tickets and therefore agreed to litigate her claims against Airtrade 
in Santa Clara County, California.”). 
212 CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Field, 612 F. Supp. 2d 660, 668 (D. Md. 2009); 
CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Meissner, 604 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764 (D. Md. 2009). 
213 No. CCB-09-0789, 2009 WL 3736526, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2009). 
214 LTVN Holdings LLC, 2009 WL 3736526 at *3. 
215 CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Copier Country N.Y., LLC, No. 08-CV-3469, 2009 
WL 3247431, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2009). 
216 DMG Am., Inc. v. RT Precision Mach., LP, No. 3:08-CV-71-RJC, 2009 WL 
1783554, at *3 (W.D.N.C. June 23, 2009). 
217 686 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (D. Md. 2010). 
218 Id. at 569.  
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 569 (“Whether that sole contact meets the “minimum contacts” requirement 
of constitutional due process is doubtful.”). 
221 Cole-Tuve, Inc. v. Am. Mach. Tools Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (D. Md. 
2004). 
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process, a court traditionally considers, inter alia, “the extent to 
which the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities in the state.”222  In Calder v. Jones, the 
Supreme Court established the “effects test,” under which courts are 
permitted to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, who 
has expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum state, knowing 
that the injury would be felt there.223  
     The Fourth Circuit interprets the effects test narrowly.224 It views the 
“express aiming” requirement “narrowly to require that the forum state be 
the focal point of the tort.”225  Ultimately, whether Maryland can assert 
personal jurisdiction in such cases turns on “the defendant’s own contacts 
with the state”; not the location of the plaintiff, the locale of his injury, or the 
plaintiff’s contacts with Maryland.226  Were it otherwise, jurisdiction would 
always be “appropriate in a plaintiff's home state, for the plaintiff always 
feels the impact of the harm there.”227  
     The Fourth Circuit has adapted Calder’s effects test to online activity.  In 
the context of the Internet, specific jurisdiction “may be based only on an 
out-of-state person’s Internet activity directed at Maryland and causing 
injury that gives rise to a potential claim cognizable in Maryland.”228  To 
obtain jurisdiction over a defendant for cyber activity tortuously affecting 
Maryland, the Fourth Circuit requires the defendant’s tortious conduct to be 
aimed at Maryland in such a way that the state “can be said to be the focal 
point of the tortious activity.”229  As discussed below,230 to establish 
jurisdiction under this test, the plaintiff would have to show not only injury 
in Maryland, but that Maryland was the epicenter of those injuries.  
     When the internet activity involves posting information on a website, the 
question is whether the defendant “manifested an intent to direct [its] website 
222 Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 397 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (citing ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 
711–12 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
223 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). 
224 ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir. 1997). 
225 Cleaning Auth., Inc. v. Neubert, 739 F. Supp. 2d 807, 815 (D. Md. 2010) (citing 
ESAB Grp., 126 F.3d at 626). 
226 Id. (citing ESAB Grp., 126 F.3d at 626). 
227 Id. (citing ESAB Grp., 126 F.3d at 626). 
228 See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 
2002) (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90). 
229 Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 398 n.7 
(4th Cir. 2003) (citing IMO Indus., Inc., v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265–66 (3d 
Cir. 1988)). 
230 Hare v. Richie, No. ELH–11–3488, 2012 WL 3773116, at *11–12 (D. Md. Aug. 
29, 2012). 
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content [to the forum state's] audience.”231  For example, a website that 
allegedly infringes on intellectual property does not automatically establish 
jurisdiction over the website’s owner, even if it is accessible in Maryland, 
particularly in the absence of other significant or sustained contacts with the 
state.232  
 
A. Cases Finding Cyber Activity Directed at Maryland 
 
     Ascertaining whether a defendant has directed cyber activity toward 
Maryland is not an exercise that readily lends itself to bright-line rules.  The 
clearest instance of directing cyber activity toward Maryland arises when the 
website has sections or features that are geared toward Maryland users.  For 
instance, in Hare v Ritchie,233 the defendant was accused of publishing 
defamatory statements about a Maryland resident on its website. The 
defendant argued that its website was accessible in every state, and thus, 
could not support jurisdiction in Maryland.234  The plaintiff conceded that 
mere internet presence would not suffice to subject the defendant to 
jurisdiction in Maryland.235  But he insisted that the site was “intentionally 
interacting with the residents of Maryland,” citing menu options which 
included Baltimore and editorial comments on posts that he characterized as 
defaming Baltimore residents.236 
     The Hare court agreed, stating “this is not a case where personal 
jurisdiction is based solely on the posting of information on a website that 
happens to be accessible in Maryland.”237  In the court’s view, the very fact 
that the site’s design permitted users to filter for Baltimore individuals meant 
that the site had specifically directed electronic activity toward Maryland: 
 
When a user submits a post, [the site] permits the user to 
select the geographic section of the website in which to 
place the content. This demonstrates an intent to direct the 
content to users in that geographic area. 
 
Moreover, [the defendant] manifested an intent to engage in 
interactions within Maryland by adding its own commentary 
to posts directed to Baltimore . . . [the defendant] must have 
known that the primary effects of the posts at issue would be 
231 See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002). 
232 Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks v. Bos. Paternity LLC, No. DKC–2008–2046, 2009 
WL 2366175, at *9 (D. Md. 2009). 
233 Hare, 2012 WL 3773116, at *3–4. 
234 Id. at *10. 
235 Id. at *11.  
236 Id.  
237 Id. at *12. 
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felt in Maryland, because they were posted in the Baltimore 
section and concerned Maryland residents and events. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that [the defendant] 
possesses the requisite minimum contacts with Maryland to 
constitute purposeful availment.238 
 
Hare presented a relatively easy case because the defendant’s alleged 
actions, the website design, and the asserted claims all aligned to support the 
claim that the defendant’s purported activities were aimed at Maryland.239 
     Nevertheless, courts have found instances of cyber activities directed at 
Maryland in less clear circumstances, such as when the sole predicate for 
jurisdiction was a globally accessible website. The key was that the effects of 
the cyber activity focused on Maryland.  In Cole-Tuve, Inc. v. Am. Mach. 
Tools Corp., the plaintiff was a Maryland corporation doing business 
exclusively in Maryland.240  The defendant, an Illinois corporation, 
registered a similar domain name, and allegedly used it to direct traffic to its 
own website.241  The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s trademark infringement suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
holding that the jurisdiction was proper because the defendant had 
purportedly registered the domain name in order to redirect Maryland 
customers away from a Maryland business.242  It explained: 
 
Accepting these allegations as true, [defendant] directed a 
harm at a Maryland business with the manifest intent of 
engaging in activities in the state by intentionally infringing 
on the rights of a company it knew to be in Maryland in 
order to misdirect its Maryland customers.243 
 
The “effects plus” requirements for personal jurisdiction were satisfied since 
the plaintiff’s business and customers were in Maryland; therefore, making 
Maryland the sole target of the defendant’s alleged conduct.244 
 
B. Cases Finding Cyber Activity Not Directed at Maryland 
 
     On the other hand, courts have generally declined to find that a 
universally accessible website is aimed at Maryland when its targeted 
238 Id. at *11–12. 
239 Hare, 2012 WL 3773116, at *11–12. 
240 342 F. Supp. 2d 362, 364–65 (D. Md. 2004). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 368. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. at 367–68. 
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audience appears to be outside the state.245  In Elec. Broking Servs., Ltd. v. E-
Bus. Solutions & Servs., the court found that the defendant’s website did not 
give Maryland personal jurisdiction since there was no evidence that the 
defendant had “intentionally targeted residents in Maryland through its 
website or directed its electronic activity into Maryland with the manifested 
intent of conducting business within the state.”246  This general rule applies 
even if the website has incidental impacts within Maryland, because 
incidental impacts are not a substitute for directed activity.  
     For instance, in Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 
the Fourth Circuit held that the Illinois defendant was not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Maryland, notwithstanding the use of an allegedly infringing 
trademark on its website and in its domain name.247  The defendant’s site 
solicited contributions through the Internet.248  Nevertheless, there had only 
been one contribution from a Maryland resident, who happened to be the 
plaintiff’s attorney.249 Most critically, the court found that the defendant’s 
website had a “strongly local character.”250  It noted that the website 
indicated that the defendant operated out of locations in Chicago and its 
suburbs, taught abstinence in Chicago public schools, and offered assistance 
to women and families in the Chicago area.251  The Fourth Circuit stated: 
 
In fact, the only respect in which [defendant] even arguably 
reaches out to Marylanders via its Internet website is in its 
generalized request that anyone, anywhere make a donation 
to support [defendant’s] Chicago-based mission. Such a 
generalized request is, under the circumstances, an 
insufficient Maryland contact to sustain jurisdiction in that 
forum.252 
      
     Similarly, in Young v. New Haven Advocate, 253 the Fourth Circuit held 
that allegedly defamatory material regarding a Virginia plaintiff, and 
accessible in Virginia, did not give Virginia jurisdiction over the 
defendant.254  The plaintiff, was the warden of a Virginia prison that had 
245 See, e.g. Allcarrier Worldwide Servs., Inc. 812 F. Supp. 2d at 683 (holding that a 
company’s “website that accepts applications from members internationally, is 
insufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Maryland”). 
246 285 F. Supp. 2d 686, 691 (D. Md. 2003). 
247 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003). 
248 Id. at 395. 
249 Id.  
250 Id. at 401. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). 
254 Id. at 264 (explaining that though the case involved Virginia law, Virginia’s long 
arm statute is virtually identical to Maryland’s, and thus provides a useful predictor 
                                                                                                                             
 
2014] Maryland Personal Jurisdiction Law in the Cyberspace Context  
 
33 
contracted with the State of Connecticut to house Connecticut prisoners.255  
The defendants were a Connecticut publication and journalists that had 
published articles, accessible on their website, that the plaintiff argued were 
defamatory.256  
     The Fourth Circuit framed the plaintiff’s argument for jurisdiction as 
whether: (1) the defendants knew that the plaintiff was a Virginia resident; 
(2) defendants defamed him; (3) they made the defamatory statements 
accessible online in Virginia; and (4) the primary effects of the defamatory 
statements were felt in Virginia.257  
     The Young court felt that this claim was too broad; the issue was whether 
the defendants had aimed their tortious conduct at a Virginia audience: “The 
newspapers must, through the Internet postings, manifest an intent to target 
and focus on Virginia readers.”258  Analyzing the facts, the Fourth Circuit 
determined that the online content, including the allegedly defamatory 
statements, were tailored to Connecticut audiences, and focused on the issue 
of Connecticut’s prison transfer policy.259  Though defendants’ content 
referenced the plaintiff, Confederate memorabilia, and Virginia, the 
defendants “could not have reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court 
[in Virginia] to answer for the truth of the statements made in their 
article[s,]”since they did not post the articles on the Internet with the 
“manifest intent” of targeting Virginia readers.260  
     This line of reasoning, which focuses on the defendant’s expectations, 
apparently seemingly follows in the footsteps of World-Wide Volkswagen.  
The bottom line is that the application of the effects test, in the Internet 
context, “requires proof that the out-of-state defendant’s Internet activity is 




     The Zippo “active/passive spectrum” seems particularly outmoded in the 
increasingly commonplace scenario of websites that collect data on users, 
and tailor content or advertising accordingly—users have become 
accustomed to noting advertisements for books, hotels, airfares or vacations 
to say, Geneva, Switzerland, after browsing Internet content related to the 
city.  Consequently, one author notes that: 
of how the Fourth Circuit would handle a similar Maryland case).  Compare VA. 
CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (2010), with MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103 
(West 2011). 
255 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 2002). 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 261–62. 
258 Id. at 262–63. 
259 Id. at 263–64. 
260 Id. at 264 (alterations in original) (quotation omitted). 
261 Young, 315 F.3d at 262–63. 
                                                                                                                                         




[W]ebsites that a user perceives to be simply ‘dead 
advertising’ or content that is not collecting significant 
amounts of information[,] and thus deemed to be relatively 
‘passive’ under the sliding scale approach may, in fact, be 
still highly interactive in real terms because of the extent of 
data collection being conducted in relation to the user.262 
 
     No case to date has adjudicated whether such customized content, 
directed to Maryland, constitutes contacts aimed at the state or purposeful 
availment of its laws.  But at least one colorful case from France suggests 
that it might. When anti-Nazi groups sued Yahoo! in connection with alleged 
sales of Nazi memorabilia via its services, a French court determined that 
Yahoo! was tailoring its content to French users based on the fact that users 
in the country were often presented with French advertisements.263  
Maryland case law does hold that a defendant may not deny purposeful 
availment on the basis that it is unaware of where its emails end up.264 
     As technology advances—with our phones, cars, watches, and homes 
becoming increasingly integrated—the question of whether particular 
activities are directed at Maryland, or entail purposeful availment of its laws, 
will acquire both increased complexity and  importance. It is unlikely that 
any revolutionary jurisprudential developments will address these new 
issues.  As with the telephone, the automobile, the airplane, and other 
technologies, answers will come in incremental developments of existing 
case law.  There will be no revolution in Maryland long-arm jurisprudence, 
only gradual evolution.  
     As the D.C. Circuit has observed: “Cyberspace . . . is not some mystical 
incantation capable of warding off the jurisdiction of courts built from bricks 
and mortar.  Just as our traditional notions of personal jurisdiction have 
proven adaptable to other changes in the national economy, so too are they 
adaptable to the transformations wrought by the Internet.”265 
262 Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network Theory Approach 
to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 493, 513 (2004). 
263 Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
Nov. 20, 2000, obs. J. Gomez (Fr.), available at http:// www.lapres.net/ya2011.html, 
also available at http://www.lapres.net/yahen11.html (providing an unofficial 
English translation). 
264 MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 166 Md. App. 481, 509, 890 A.2d 
818, 834 (2006) (“First Choice cannot plead lack of purposeful availment because 
the ‘nature’ of the Internet does not allow it to know the geographic location of its 
email recipients.”). 
265 See Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
                                                                                                                             
